I think that randomized controlled trials (RCTs) are highly relevant to clinical practice. If I had a serious medical illness, I would want to know that what I was about to receive actually worked and how it fared relative to other treatment options. Saying that something works means that it has a causal effect (relative to its absence), and saying that it works better than other options means that its impact is even larger than those other options. The most powerful method yet devised to determine whether something has a causal effect (or how it compares with other options) is to test it in an RCT. I think that people with psychological disorders deserve the same level of certainty as people with medical disorders; I want to know whether what I do works. I do not defend RCTs because I conduct them, I conduct RCTs because I can defend them.
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All causal inference starts with observation. If I want to know if a treatment works, I want to know what happens to people who get treated. If I had a serious medical illness, the first thing I would do is talk to other people who had the disorder and find out what they did and how it went. The problem with relying on such anecdotal observations is that I could never know whether what happened was a consequence of treatment. I would be glad if all the outcomes were benign, but that would not tell me that treatment was necessary to produce those happy outcomes. When my son was growing up he played soccer with teammates who were spanked by their parents when they misbehaved. When those parents observed that we did not spank our son, they were curious as to how we expected him to learn right from wrong. Their parents had spanked them when they were young and they had turned out well. Therefore, they believed it was their obligation as caring and responsible parents to spank their children if they wanted them to turn out well. The fact that something happens does not mean that is was caused by what you did.
I may decide to talk to people who had been treated and others who had not (if any were still living) and see how each turned out. This is a quasi-experiment in which people are exposed to different treatments and their subsequent outcomes are observed. The problem with this strategy is that it confounds individual differences with differential treatment. Considered medical opinion for the last several decades has been that women going through menopause benefited from hormone replacement therapy. Women who were treated with estrogen did appear to do better than women who were not. The problem with this inference was that women were free to choose whether they received estrogen or not and those who choose estrogen typically took better care of themselves and had better access to health care. When the field finally got around to doing an RCT on adding estrogen, the study was stopped before completion because replacement therapy increased the risk for cancer and heart disease. 1 It is not that the doctors providing hormone replacement therapy did not care about their patients or that the women treated with it did not care about their health. We simply did not have the right kind of data to draw an accurate causal inference, and a generation of women suffered as a consequence.
Randomization is designed to control for individual differences. If people sort themselves into conditions for reasons related to the differences between them then any subsequent outcomes observed could be as much a consequence of preexistent individual differences as a consequence of treatment. Good intentions are not enough to do right by patients; hard data are needed that speak to the causal potency of a treatment. RCTs remain the single best (but not the only) way to collect such data. RCTs control for spontaneous remission and other factors related to the passage of time, and they control for individual differences that can affect subsequent course. RCTs are not perfect and they are not our only source of information, but they remain the best strategy we have for drawing accurate causal inferences. To paraphrase Churchill on democracy, RCTs are fallible and far from perfect; the only good thing that we can say about them is that they are better than the alternatives. 2 If an RCT had been conducted on the treatments I was considering, how relevant would that information be to me? I would hope that at least some of the patients treated were similar to me and that the nature of the treatment studied was similar to what I was planning to receive. RCTs are most informative when patients, therapists, and procedures are all clinically representative. That is what is called external validity. 3 The more clinically representative the trial(s), the greater the confidence I can have that the findings tell me what to expect when I get treated. Analogue studies using subjects who are not real patients and are treated by inexperienced therapists relying on unrepresentative procedures can sometimes tell us something, but I would hesitate to go under the knife if that was all we had. 4 External validity is not necessarily incompatible with internal validity (the ability to draw a strong causal inference), it just can be harder to arrange. The studies that I value most are those studies that tell us something true about what happens when real patients are treated by practising clinicians using fully representative interventions.
It is fashionable to say that RCTs are not relevant to clinical practice. I do not believe that is necessarily true. In the service of becoming a better clinician, I have tried to test the causal efficacy of the treatments that I use. I was a therapist in the original study that suggested that cognitive therapy may be superior to medication in the treatment of depression. 5 I took comfort from the fact that my practice may have an empirical basis, but I wanted to see a replication at a separate site before I believed the results. A subsequent study suggested that cognitive therapy was no more efficacious than medication 6 but that it might be more enduring. 7 I was a therapist again in a third trial that found that cognitive therapy was as efficacious as medication in the treatment of severe depression 8 and also more enduring. 9 If I am going to use a treatment then I want to test it (or at least be sure that this is being done by someone I trust).
I was recently involved in another clinical trial in which a newly developed behavioural activation treatment outperformed my preferred cognitive therapy among patients with more severe depressions. 10 These findings unsettled me greatly. I want to see this study replicated (I would no more trust the findings from a single study conducted at the site at which a treatment was developed than I trusted the initial findings from the study by Rush Most reasonable treatments work better than their absence and it is still unclear that anything works better than anything else, on average. 11 However, there are many gaps in the literature, especially for more severe disorders, and the more traditional approaches to psychotherapy have not been adequately tested. That does not mean that they do not work (absence of evidence is not the same as evidence of absence); however, it does mean that some potentially efficacious treatments may lack the empirical support they might otherwise have earned. Some treatments are harder to test than others, and it seems a bit unfair that interventions such as medication treatment and the cognitive and behavioural therapies lend themselves so nicely to empirical evaluation. Nonetheless, people tend to vote with their feet, and the proportion of patients who got treated with medication for depression doubled during the last decade while the proportion receiving psychotherapy declined. 12 Concurrently, the proportion of therapists who describe themselves as having a cognitive orientation has grown while those who describe themselves as being psychodynamic has declined. 13 I suspect that this is less a matter of existing clinicians changing their orientation than new clinicians adopting an approach with good empirical data. Patients tend to prefer treatments that are known to work to those about which little is known, and therapists entering the field tend to prefer to provide those treatments that patients prefer.
It is fashionable to decry the so-called medicalization of psychotherapy. In fact, medicine did not invent the RCT and psychiatry was not the first discipline to use it to study the treatment of psychological disorders. The latter distinction goes to Carl Rogers and his client-centred colleagues (see Rogers and Dymond 14 ) . You do not have to act as a scientist when doing treatment to want to evaluate the efficacy of your therapy in a scientific fashion. What Rogers knew was that therapies that are efficacious are more likely to help patients and that therapies that can be shown to be efficacious are more likely to attract adherents. Rogers may have been nondirective but he was no fool. Psychodynamic psychotherapy has not been all that adequately tested (which may account for why it has been losing market share); however, such tests are not impossible to conduct. Rob DeRubeis was my first doctoral student and remains my closest colleague and collaborator across the years. Jacques Barber was his first advisee [student] and a devotee of psychodynamic psychotherapy. Jacques is currently in the midst of conducting an RCT evaluating the efficacy of time-limited dynamic psychotherapy in the treatment of depression. I know Jacques and his devotion to his preferred approach. If anyone can determine whether dynamic psychotherapy is efficacious in the treatment of depression, it is he. If he finds that dynamic psychotherapy can hold its own relative to medication, I will be impressed and others will be impressed as well. That is because RCTs are relevant to clinical practice. When done well they influence what we believe and what we do.
Steven D Hollon

Clinical Trials for the Treatment of Mental Disorders: 2 Major Flaws That Limit Interpretability
T he understanding of something is often formed without adequate understanding of how it came to be and what was omitted as a result. This claim could well be made with reference to clinical trials of the treatment of mental disorders. In this article, the history of clinical trials will be reviewed briefly, which will be followed by a discussion of the methodological inadequacies of adapting clinical trials in the area of mental disorders.
History of Clinical Trials
The idea of randomization as a means to control bias was addressed systematically in the early decades of the 20th century, most prominently by Sir Ronald Fisher. Fisher, banished to an agricultural station by the imperious Karl Pearson, used randomization as a means to estimate the variability in outcomes that could be attributable to systematic causes as opposed to random causes. Fisher 1 developed the analysis of variance to determine the "separation of the variance ascribable to one group of causes from the variance ascribable to other groups" p 211 or "the relative importance of two groups of factors causing variation." p 221 The essential feature of the analysis of variance was the randomization of units to conditions so that the expected random error could be estimated to provide a robust estimate of the variability owing to systematic sources. At about the same time, randomized designs were being developed in the United States by psychologists, whose first application was in education for the purpose of determining the most effective educational practice.
An additional component of the randomized design was needed to adapt the randomized design to medicine. Comparisons of a medical treatment to no treatment could not establish that the benefits of the treatment were due to the specific ingredients of the treatment and not to the expectation of the patient, hope, or other psychological factors. The development of the placebo control in the United States and the United Kingdom in the mid-20th century was intended to rule out psychological factors and to demonstrate the specificity of a treatment. The validity of the randomized placebo control group depends on indistinguishability and blinding. 2 That is, the placebo and the treatment should be identical except for the specific ingredient contained in the treatment, and the addition of the specific ingredient must not be detectable by the participants in the experiment (namely, the patient, the physician, and the evaluator).
It would appear then that the randomized experimental design, with origins in agriculture, education, and psychology, and adapted to medicine by incorporating a placebo control group with blinding, would be the ideal means to establish the efficacy of treatment of mental disorders. Unfortunately, the application of the randomized design to examine treatments of mental disorders is flawed-badly flawed. Two major flaws are discussed here.
The Flaws
Flaw #1: Correct Model Ignored-and the Importance of the Provider
Since the origins of the randomized design and the analysis of variance, the importance of correctly modelling the factors in a design has known to be critical to making valid inferences. For example, the split plot design was developed because factors common to a plot (for example, fertilizers) had to be considered. However, in each of the contexts in which randomized designs were used, the application ignored the provider of the service: the farmer, the teacher, and the physician. In these contexts, the experimental units (say, patients) are nested within the provider (say, physicians). This oversight was made despite the fact that statisticians and experimenters in other fields were exquisitely aware of the problems that incorrectly specifying a model would have on inferences. 3 The problem is essentially this. The observations nested within another factor are not independent. That is, if providers of service vary in terms of their effectiveness, then observations within providers are more similar than observations between providers (that is, the intraclass correlation is greater than zero), violating a fundamental assumption of the analysis of variance. This is not a trivial oversight! Ignoring the provider has several consequences. The goal of research on treating mental disorders is to identify the factors that account for variability in outcomes. Ignoring the provider precludes discovering whether or not the therapist accounts for variability in outcomes. To my knowledge, there have been no psychotherapy or psychopharmacology trials designed to detect whether some therapists consistently produce better outcomes than others, despite compelling evidence that the therapist effects are relatively large-up to an order of magnitude larger than treatment effects. 4 In psychotherapy, differences among treatments account for, at most, 1% of the variability in outcomes, whereas the therapist accounts for about 8% of the variability. In a pharmacotherapy trial, it was found that an antidepressant was more effective than a placebo, accounting for 3% of the variability in outcome; however, the psychiatrist, providing weekly clinical management, accounted for 9% of the variability in outcomes-indeed, the more effective psychiatrists had better outcomes administering placebos than the poorer psychiatrists had administering the antidepressant. 5 The second consequence of ignoring the therapist as a factor in clinical trials is more pernicious. The nonindependence of observations within therapist results in inflated type I error rates and effect sizes. That is, ignoring provider effects will lead to false conclusions about treatment differences and exaggerated claims of effects. 6, 7 Simply, the null hypothesis of no treatment effects will be rejected in favour of an alternative claim that a treatment is effective or more effective than another treatment at rates greater than the nominal 5%. Consequently, more claims made about treatments may be false than we expect, a distasteful state of affairs about which we do not like to ponder. Further, the effect sizes that populate meta-analyses are similarly inflated, exacerbating the problem.
The final issue regarding therapists is that the generalizability of the results is severely limited. One wants inferences made from clinical trials to apply to therapists in practice, yet the therapists in clinical trials typically are: selected for their expertise, provided extra training, supervised, and monitored. The conditions in clinical practice are remarkably different. Exacerbating this problem is that when therapists are examined, they are often treated as a fixed factor (that is, not randomly selected from a population of therapists), thereby conditioning the results of the study to the therapists who actually delivered the treatment. 3 Essentially, ignoring therapists makes the assumption that there is no variability in outcomes owing to therapists from one sample to another. Consequently, when therapists are ignored, the results of the study are specific to the therapists who participated in the study. No researcher is prepared to state, "The results of this groundbreaking study apply only to the 4 therapists who delivered the treatments"; nonetheless, that is exactly the statement that is appropriate given the design and analysis of the experiment.
Flaw #2: Problems With Placebo Control Groups
To be valid, clinical trials must use a placebo that is identical to the treatment except for the critical ingredient and is indistinguishable from the treatment and must, as well, be properly blinded. In psychotherapy studies, none of these conditions are present. If the researcher is comparing 2 psychotherapies, they are clearly distinguishable and the therapists providing the respective treatments are well aware of the treatment being administered, quite obviously. This can insidiously invalidate a study. Consider the case in which the research objective is to show the superiority of a new and innovative treatment and the therapists are aware that they are delivering this very attractive treatment or the old, tired treatment. It is no small wonder then that researcher allegiance effects are very strong in psychotherapy studies. 8, 9 Consistently, the results of psychotherapy trials favour treatments that the researcher has developed or advocated. This same problem is encountered when psychotherapy researchers attempt to demonstrate specificity by comparing a treatment with a psychological placebo-a psychotherapy without any specific ingredients. The therapists delivering an inert psychological treatment will unlikely offer it in a way that will create positive expectations for change, knowing that it is not intended to be therapeutic. As troublesome is that the psychological placebo is not identical to the specific treatment without the active ingredients-psychological placebos typically have no structure, no rationale, and no set of therapeutic actions, all of which are components that patients expect and are common to all treatments. 9 That is, they lack aspects that characterize psychotherapy.
Pharmacotherapy trials are not immune to these problems. Much of the effect, it appears, of psychotropic medication is due to psychological factors, despite the modest separation of medication and placebo. 10 To say that the placebo effect (that is, placebo, compared with natural history) is unimportant because it is due to psychological rather than biological factors is ironic given that the target complaints are psychological-so why are psychological factors not important? Conceivably, a placebo could produce commendable benefits for the treatment of a particular disorder and that a substance with purported active ingredients does not produce substantially better outcomes; this results in null findings that are of little interest to the field, when indeed both placebo and medication are producing significant and quite possibly clinically important effects.
The problems discussed in Flaw #1 and #2 come together to make comparisons of psychotherapy and medications difficult to interpret. When psychotherapy is compared with medication, the effects of the medication condition is a combination of medication effects and psychological effects; the psychological effects can be enhanced by larger so-called doses of clinical management. For example, in the National Institute of Mental Health's Treatment of Depression Collaborative Research Program (TDCRP), in which an antidepressant was compared with 2 psychotherapies, the patients in the medication condition received 20 to 30 minutes of weekly interaction with the psychiatrists, who were chosen for their clinical skill, during which time the psychiatrists provided encouragement, support, and direct advice. 11 This leaves open the question of whether equivalence of psychotherapy and medication in a clinical trial is due to the medication in the medication condition or to psychological effects of the clinical management as well as psychological effects of the placebo. There is great variability in psychiatrist-patient interaction in medication conditions, creating additional confusion. Interestingly, in the TDCRP, the psychiatrists effects were large, 5 suggesting that much of the variability in outcomes was due to the psychiatrists, rather than the treatment.
Conclusion
In this brief comment, I have pointed out the 2 major flaws of clinical trials for the treatment of mental disorders. Clinical trials would be more informative if the correct design and analysis were used, which would consider random models at both the patient and the therapist level, and the limitations related to placebos, blinding, and distinguishability were recognized. Unfortunately, researchers ignore these flaws and make interpretations that may not reflect the true effectiveness of treatments.
Rebuttals
Can Randomized Controlled Trials Be Made Even More Relevant to Clinical Practice?
I n his thoughtful response, Professor Wampold describes the pernicious effects of failing to take therapist effects into account and the problem with placebo control groups. There is considerable merit to both points (especially the first) and the field would benefit from taking his concerns into account. Neither obviates the value of randomized controlled trials (RCTs), which remain the single best way to determine whether what we do makes a difference; however, attention to the issues that he raises could serve to make those trials even better guides to clinical practice. As with most investigators, I have tended to ignore therapist effects when analyzing my data, which, I understand from Professor Wampold, inflates statistical tests for treatment effects. I will never make that mistake again (nor will I treat therapists as fixed effects). However, even detecting differences between my therapists in the outcomes they produce will not specify their source; such differences could be a product of nonspecific therapist behaviours, unrelated to the modality being tested, or they could reflect differences between therapists in the skill with which they implement the specific intervention. In a recent trial we found that patients who responded to cognitive therapy were considerably less likely to relapse following treatment termination than patients who responded to treatment with medications and no more likely to relapse than patients who continued on medications. 1 In response to the concerns raised by Professor Wampold, we have gone back to look for therapist differences and found that one of our therapists was an outlier who produced no discernable enduring effect. What we will do next is to see if we can determine whether this was a consequence of preexistent patient characteristics or differences in treatment process and whether specific or nonspecific. Professor Wampold is correct in pointing out that therapist differences are important, and they can be best understood in the context of an RCT. I also agree with Professor Wampold that it is very difficult to construct a credible nonspecific control for psychotherapy; however, I do not think that control is necessary to establish differential efficacy. Placebo controls are used in medication research to separate so-called true drug effects from the psychosocial context in which they are delivered. That is an exercise in construct validity that is intended to determine whether the medication in question has any pharmacological effect. 2 However, we do not have to determine how something works to establish whether it works better than its absence (efficacy) or better than something else (differential efficacy). It is easier to detect an effect than it is to explain it, and questions of mechanism will always be harder to resolve than questions of differential efficacy. Nonetheless, questions of differential efficacy are relevant to clinical practice and RCTs (if done correctly) provide the best platform for addressing these issues because they guarantee the internal validity of the design. Attending to the issues raised by Professor Wampold should enhance even further the relevance of RCTs to clinical practice.
Steven D Hollon
Clinical Trials and Positivism: Restricted Evidence Can Be Misleading
A t the dawn of the Enlightenment, there was a rejection of the metaphysical and an emerging focus on observable relations. Auguste Comte is given credit for systematizing a philosophy of truth based on observation, known as positivism. Positivism, often carelessly associated with any empirical approach, is actually quite restricted in that, in this philosophy of science, knowledge is derived from observation and explanation is avoided (except in the special case of mathematical knowledge). 1,2 In a positivistic system, causality is simply the regularity of antecedents and consequences (that is, co-occurrence). When Professor Hollon states that RCTs are the best way to establish causality, he appears to be making that claim within a positivistic framework: the application of Treatment A results in Outcome X. In the positivistic tradition, this co-occurrence is paramount and explanations as to the cause of the observations are assiduously avoided.
Many, including me, feel that understanding the mechanisms of change in psychotherapy and in pharmacotherapy is critical. Medicine is not simply a list of treatments that are efficacious for particular disorders-medicine would never have progressed without understanding the basic biology of disease and examining mediating biological processes for efficacious treatments. Focusing on the explanation, regarding both the disorder and the treatment of disorder, is absolutely critical to progress.
The positivistic stance avoids generalization based on theoretical constructs. Accordingly, generality is established only by exhaustive replications. Of course, no one is an orthodox positivist any longer and certainly not Professor Hollon, who recognizes that "RCTs [randomized controlled trials] are most informative when patients, therapists, and procedures are all clinically representative." But representativeness of the sort that Professor Hollon refers to requires theory-both statistical (that is, random sampling à la Fisher) and substantive (that is, a theory of what is important in the treatment). And this is where RCTs for the treatment of mental disorders goes astray as they focus only on one aspect of treatment-the specific ingredients in the particular treatment. Does this particular treatment work in this particular context? For this question, an RCT is the design of choice. But to address whether the treatment works more generally, we need to know much about the disorder and the context, as well a viable understanding of how the treatment works. If one is truly interested in representativeness of therapists, one would randomly select therapists and consider therapists as a random factor in the design. Understandably (if you believe therapists make a difference!), clinical trialists typically use highly skilled, specially trained, and supervised therapists. As I have discussed, ignoring therapists renders RCTs seriously flawed in that the results are specific to the therapists in the study, which is a very narrow (and positivistic) conclusion.
To be fair, RCTs, when properly constructed for studying the treatment of mental disorders (for example, by considering therapists as a facet of the design), have a very important place in the research agenda. After all, it was a clinical trial (single, blinded) that established that Mesmer's effectiveness was not due to animal magnetism. 3 But care has to be taken to design the RCTs appropriately and to make the appropriate inferences given the design. After all, had Mesmer's treatments been compared with a no-treatment control, rather than having been labelled a charlatan, his treatments would have been validated (that is, they actually helped patients). To his credit, Professor Hollon's contributions to understanding the effects of treatments via RCTs are profound. However, clinical trials generally are not useful for studying the psychological processes involved in therapy for mental disorders, and it is important to distinguish what can be known and what cannot be known from clinical trials.
As a coda, I would be remiss not to mention that the popularity of a treatment is not simply a function of the evidence of effectiveness, and it is misleading to attribute the use of a treatment to its true effectiveness. More than likely, patients choose a therapist who they find that they can work with collaboratively and effectively, rather than presenting to a therapist who delivers a treatment established as efficacious in an RCT. And, indeed, these patients would be intuitively heeding the best research evidence that suggests that in mental health treatment it is the therapist rather than the particular treatment that is most important. 3 
